In international nature conservation policy, value-arguments based on science and economic rationalism increasingly overshadow the aesthetic and ethical arguments that originally inspired the conservation movement. We argue that this trend risks removing conservation from the public realm, in part because it facilitates the adoption by nongovernment conservation bodies of corporate values and / or their integration with government bureaucracies. By contrast, the explicit recognition of aesthetic and ethical values would complement arguments based on science and economic utility. We subscribe to a reformist view of globalization that accepts the inevitability of a globalizing world but argues that the process needs humanizing by incorporating quality of life values in the policy process. We argue that re-emphasis of aesthetic and ethical arguments in international conservation policy would contribute to this goal by reasserting links between conservation bodies and the public, thereby leading to more effective action on the ground.
INTRODUCTION
Nature conservation can be thought of as a social movement working to develop or reassert certain values in society concerning the human-nature relationship (Jepson & Canney, 2001; Jepson & Whittaker, 2002) . Social values are sets of ideals and beliefs to which people individually and collectively aspire and which they desire to uphold (Audi, 1999) . They structure the traditions, institutions and laws that underpin society. In our view, the adoption, rejection and modification of values through public debate and other processes legitimizes society and creates social stability and quality livelihoods. Social movements are informal collections of individuals and agencies that articulate particular value sets whose adoption, they believe, will create a 'better' world.
Our concern is that overemphasis on expert-led science and economic rationalism as a means to deliver the goals of conservation obscures some values and stresses others. Landes (1967) defines rationality as the adaptation of means to ends. The relevant ends for economics and science in conservation are material wealth and environmental health, respectively. However, humanity's set of valid ends is more eclectic and includes, for example, emotional and spiritual well-being.
Therefore, to maintain a vibrant public mandate, conservation policy needs to champion these important spheres of human concern alongside the more limited economic and instrumental values. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the conservation movement to operate internationally, we suggest, is founded on the combination of:
• the worth of the social values espoused;
• the belief that they are values with universal appeal and that all societies and cultures will benefit from their adoption; • the membership base of organizations prominent in the movement;
• the status of individuals promoting the cause.
Values-led conservation is an initiative to redress the balance, and give new policy and social relevance to the conservation movement in the 21st century. It is founded on the recognition that action to protect nature happens when arguments are framed in terms that resonate with the combination of imagination, feelings and rationality that guide decision making in people's everyday lives (Midgley, 2001) . Reliance on scientific argumentation alone risks alienating those who have other valid motivations for conservation. This can entrench feelings of powerlessness and fuel notions of imposition by an 'establishment'. In contrast, social values are more eclectic and draw on a holistic blend of culture, science and social vision. In our view, the role of scientific information is to inform and help deliver social agendas not determine them.
SOCIAL VALUES OF THE CONSER VATION MOVEMENT
Many social values emerge when individually held values are challenged by changes in awareness about circumstances and relationships. The conservation movement emerged in the late 19th century in response to fundamental changes in world-view concerning the human nature-relationship (Jepson & Whittaker, 2002) , and gained new momentum in the second half of the 20th century when science further expanded understandings of the society-nature relationship (see for example Frank et al ., 1999) . The movement appears to be characterized by six distinct values (below) and a focus on protected areas as the primary means of delivering these values. Three values (1-3 below) derive from aesthetic and ethical beliefs and were emphasized by the early (pre-World War II) international conservation movement. Two values (4 & 5) are based on prudence and utility and the final value (6) derives from notions of justice and is emphasized by the contemporary movement. 1 Human conquest of nature carries a moral responsibility for the perpetuation of other life forms (Hornaday, 1914) . 2 Wanton consumption and merciless slaughter of wildlife is uncivilized (ibid.). 3 Aesthetic and intellectual contemplation of nature is integral to the biological and cultural inheritance of many peoples and monuments of nature, like great works of art and architecture, should be guarded from ruin (Conwentz, 1909) . 4 Healthy ecosystems are necessary to safeguard economic growth, quality livelihoods and social stability (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1992; Daily, 1997; Carson, 1999) . 5 It is prudent to maintain the Earth's genetic library from which society has derived the basis of its agriculture and medicine (Myers, 1979) . 6 Society has a moral duty to permit traditional peoples inhabiting natural landscapes to choose their own destiny in time-frames appropriate to their history and culture.
The first two values were promoted by eclectic networks of prominent citizens in East Coast America starting in the 1880s and led by Theodore Roosevelt (Hayden, 1942) . The third value is more closely associated with the European conservation movement at the turn of the 20th century. It was influenced by German Romanticism and among its prominent early proponents were Frederick Willem van Eden in Holland and the German forester Hugo Conwentz (Windt, 1999) . These three values energised a trans-atlantic conservation movement that succeeded in institutionalizing wildlife sanctuaries, national parks, and species protection laws in the systems of international governance. The two prudence-based values have their origins in the 'wise-use movement' that also dates from the late 19th century, but came to policy prominence again in the 1970s, in part as a result of growth of scientific rationalism and concerns of resource shortages (Meadows et al ., 1972) . The final value also has a long history in the conservation movement but gained greater prominence in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of the environmental movement's concern with 'justice' (WCED, 1987) .
We suggest that it is the combination of these values that defines conservation as a social movement. However, the first three 'intrinsic' value-arguments have faded from view in the policy rhetoric of governments and international nongovernment organizations (INGOs). The reasons for this are complex, but can be understood in terms of: (a) the shift from 'civilization' to 'development' as the overriding cultural ideal driving international relations during the postcolonial transition; (b) the tactical recognition that government support for conservation can be strengthened if arguments are framed in terms consistent with economic development; (c) the recognition by scientists that their ability to represent nature in units (species, habitats, etc.) creates the opportunity to integrate ecological theory with neo-classical economics. This is because dividing nature into parts creates discrete units that can be assigned a monetary value, thereby creating the possibility of treating units of nature as commodities and aligning nature conservation with the free-market delivery of public benefits (Beatie & Ehrlich, 2001 ). In particular, the development of methods of measuring the costs and benefits of particular human interventions are more attractive to political decision-makers precisely because they produce a justification for taking one route rather than another, which evades the more intractable problems that are raised when different social groups hold different intrinsic values.
CAUSES FOR CONCERN IN THE CONSER VATION ESTABLISHMENT
Related to the above, a number of parallel trends are evident in the contemporary conservation movement:
• the 'bureaucratic capture' of the movement (Young & Meijaard, 2002) ; • the growing corporate outlook of the international conservation establishment;
• the growth of expert hegemony linked to the promotion of the technocratic term 'biodiversity'. Once a social agenda secures the attention of the government there is a tendency to re-define it in terms consistent with political and bureaucratic needs (Derry, 2000) . In order to gain access to funds and policy, interstate organization such as World Bank and UNDP and bi-lateral aid agencies, require civil society organizations to articulate their cause in terms consistent with dominant development policies. To receive funds, conservation agencies must re-structure organizational and financial systems to support the delivery of development targets and act as relays in the flow of money from OECD countries to developing countries. The risk is that conservation agencies will act more like government contractors and less like NGOs, i.e. the champions of an independent sphere of values and ideas in society that are located between the state, the market and organized religion. In short, conservation agencies risk becoming instrumentalities of the state. Such 'bureaucratic capture' of conservation is increasingly evident in developing countries, where agencies founded to champion nature now act as implementers of rural-development projects with tenuous links to the delivery of the social values outlined above.
The growth in public concern for nature and the environment (Frank et al ., 1999) creates the possibility to raise substantial funds from public subscription, philanthropic and corporate donations and governments. Conservation agencies are adopting business techniques to capitalize on this opportunity (Knudson, 2001) . In the process they may also adopt corporate values and package conservation as a commodity. In this scenario, focus shifts from on-the-ground delivery of conservation to organizational growth and market share. Conservation agencies perceive themselves as competing with each other for donor dollars, which undermines their potential to effect coordinated action for social change.
Linked with these developments is the adoption of the term 'biodiversity' as the label for international conservation action (Haila & Kouki, 1994) . Notwithstanding its power in certain strata of society, this technocratic term is difficult to integrate with culture and does not represent the feelings, meanings and practices of everyday life. In practice, this means that planning the implementation of biodiversity conservation becomes the domain of a small number of specially trained professionals able to identify units of biodiversity and who are located in INGOs, government institutes and academic departments. This promotes an attitude of 'trust us, we are the experts' that risks alienating the conservation establishment from other walks of life. This compromises public support and the wider social relevance of the conservationist cause.
CONSER VATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD
These trends may reflect aspects of a globalizing world, in particular the emergence of supranational organizationsbureaucracies, companies and NGOs -whose overarching goal is wealth creation legitimized on the basis of alleviating poverty. This process is inadvertently promoting materialism as a universal social value. Wealth creation is necessary, but without checks and balances materialism and the consumerist culture threaten objects (physical and abstract) that we value deeply and are essential for individual and social well-being. These include objects that promote a sense of 'groundedness', security, identity and spirituality, whose value is difficult to capture in monetary terms. Anheier et al . (2001) identify three positions on globalization: supporters, rejecters and reformers. We subscribe to a reformist view, which accepts the spread of 'free' markets and global interconnectedness as potentially beneficial to humanity but sees the need to 'civilise' the process. We argue that the affirmation of social values is central to any such process. We identify with the urgent need to construct a world culture that embraces a suite of social values with 'universal' appeal and that can deliver human needs on the time scale of our lives (e.g. three generations) (Boli & Thomas, 1999) . The antiglobalization declaration 'we are a people not a market, and our world is not for sale' (New Internationalist UK advertising campaign, 2002) is but one call expressing fears that, as Outhwaite (1994) argues, money and power alone can not deliver what people want.
The six values outlined earlier have the potential to help deliver universal human needs and the three 'intrinsic' valuearguments are particularly powerful at inspiring delivery of longer-term human needs relating to self-esteem, belonging, identity, creative expression and spirituality. For example, areas such as the English Lake District, Yosemite and the Serengeti, all of which bring massive public benefit, were designated as parks largely because of the romanticizing efforts of, in these examples, the poet William Wordsworth, the writer-naturalist John Muir, the landscape photographer C.E. Watkin, and the zoologist-adventurers Berhard & Michael Gzimeck (Grzimek & Grzimek, 1960; Mabey, 1980; Sanborn, 1989) . It is inconceivable to think that these parks would exist if instead scientists had promoted bio-prospecting, carbon-sequestration, and harvesting of nontimber forest products as reasons for their designation. In short, would society have legislated for the protection and management of these areas if this had been justified in the prosaic terms of utility rather than the inspiring terms of the aesthetic and ethical?
Explicit recognition of a wider array of conservation values could revitalize conservation as a movement concerned with creating social visions beyond basic survival, or more specifically, beyond a survival framed by the products and services that corporations can 'produce'. These visions are provided by the diffuse and heterogeneous social institutions concerned with the arts, organized sport, recreation, heritage, and life-style. Nature is an important domain within all these institutions. This is why aesthetic and ethical conservation values are important and should be used to assemble and guide the instruments of state responsible for social well-being.
Explicit recognition of values would also promote greater transparency about what a conservation agency stands for in all aspects of its operation: from membership recruitment, fund-raising, through to public education, policy lobbying and on-the-ground project implementation. It would push the management of conservation agencies to engage more closely with their public constituencies and guard against the temptation to act as contractors for government or business.
Crucially, it would enable bodies in developing countries to choose co-operation with international conservation agencies on the basis of the social values that they desire to strengthen in their own society. Because accountability goes hand-in-hand with quality, taking these steps will ensure that international conservation agencies meet the increasing levels of media, public and corporate scrutiny that becoming a global player entails.
Finally, we recognize that there is unease within the mostly western-located conservation establishment that explicit promotion of social values could be construed as a continuation of western cultural hegemony with connotations of imperialism. Our view is that the right for people to choose their own futures lies at the heart of the liberal democratic endeavour. Choices require options and the conservation movement should not shy away from presenting choices. To this end what matters is not so much the political-cultural context in which a value was formulated, but whether a legitimate constituency believe the value is good and worthy of public debate.
